Agents are about to do real work on real infrastructure — that's where this is all heading. The teams who get there safely will be the ones who solved the credential problem first. aixcl is how: it sits between your agents (Claude Code · Cursor · Codex · MCP) and your resources, so the agent never sees a secret, you stay in the loop with TOTP, and every action lands in a tamper-evident audit. We've already built it.
You want AI agents to do real work on your infrastructure — query a production database, SSH a server, call a billable API, push code for review. Today there are two ways to make that work. Neither is good.
It now lives in the agent's prompt, its context window, its logs, and potentially upstream provider databases. Rotation is theatre — the secret has been seen.
You're now hosting LLMs, paying for tokens, owning a chat-history database, building moderation. You're reinventing the agent layer Claude Code / Cursor already do well.
Even if you survive the first two, you still can't tell your auditor which agent did what, with which approval, against which resource. The trail is in five tools.
aixcl runs on five primitives. You submit tasks; agents work on them; brokers execute the auth'd actions on resources; you audit and approve from a project workshop.
A git-backed workspace with a roster of agents, a task list, and a stream of audit. One project per workstream.
An MCP client (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) authenticated by a PAT. Identity, per-project role, scope.
The aixcld daemon on the destination host. Holds credentials locally only. Executes verbs. Returns sanitised results.
A named target a broker acts on — Postgres DB, HTTP API, SSH host, EC2 instance, fleet member.
State machine: pending → in_progress → awaiting_review → completed. Append-only handoff log.
Every action through aixcl moves through the same path. The agent never sees a credential. You approve once with TOTP, not per agent. The audit is written as you go.
Via MCP tools: "run docker ps on prod-host" or "query analytics_db with this SQL". No credential attached.
aixcl renders the intent in the dashboard, scoped to a specific verb + params + TTL. You see exactly what would happen.
Once per task, not per agent. The grant is signed (Ed25519) and provisioned to the broker.
The aixcld daemon on the destination host — the only place that holds the actual secret — runs the verb and returns a sanitised result to the agent.
Sanitised params · outcome · byte counts · source IP · the approval that authorised it. Tamper-evident. Exportable.
One workspace per project. Pending grants in front, audit behind. Sidebar surfaces the queue, the roster, and the resources. Below: a real screen from aixcl alpha.
aixcl ships with the substrate already done. Cryptography, audit, MCP transport, broker enrollment, workshop UI — all of it. You bring your agents and your resources. We handle the in-between.
Streamable HTTP MCP transport at /mcp. Drop your PAT into Claude Code, Cursor, or any MCP client. Works in 30 seconds.
db.query, http.call, ssh.run, compute.{list,describe,start,stop,terminate,create}, member.dispatch. Scoped, signed, executed.
Enrolled at registration. Replay-protected. One TOTP per task, not per agent. You stay in the loop without becoming the bottleneck.
Per-tenant DEK, KMS-wrapped. AES-256-GCM for sealed data. Ed25519 for signed policies. Tenant isolation via Postgres RLS.
Git-backed workspaces. Per-session checkouts. MR workflow. Roster + audit + open MRs + resources in one view. State machine for tasks.
Single-file CJS bundle. aixcld up for one-line enrollment. Persistent + ephemeral modes. Auto-reconnect, token rotation, heartbeat.
The credential lives only at the broker, on the destination host. The control plane never sees it. The agent never sees it. That's the entire architectural insight.
PAT, agent-side context.
DEK (KMS-wrapped), signing keys, audit, policies.
db.query, http.call, ssh.run, compute.*.
Every verb is scoped, audited, and signed. The agent constructs the intent; aixcl decides whether to execute it. Four representative verbs shown below.
// agent submits an intent { "verb": "db.query", "resource": "analytics_db", "sql": "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events …", "ttl": 60 } // → pending grant → TOTP → broker executes → sanitised rows back
// agent submits an intent { "verb": "ssh.run", "resource": "prod-host-1", "cmd": "docker ps", "ttl": 30 } // → TOTP → aixcld runs command → stdout/stderr returned
// agent submits an intent { "verb": "http.call", "resource": "stripe-api", "method": "GET", "path": "/v1/customers?limit=10" } // → broker authenticates with the API key it holds locally
// agent submits an intent { "verb": "compute.list", "resource": "aws-prod-eu", "filter": { "tag:env": "staging" } } // → IAM creds stay in the broker; only the list comes back
Per-tenant data-encryption keys, KMS-wrapped. AES-256-GCM for sealed data. Ed25519 for signed policies. Postgres RLS for tenant isolation. The brief we send your CISO is shorter than the one you send your team.
aixcl is in alpha with a small group of founding users. The crypto, broker, MCP, and audit substrate is integration-tested against real Postgres. The UX iterates weekly. We're opening a few more alpha slots before public availability.
All pass against a real Postgres on each commit. The substrate is solid.
Multi-tenant Postgres + Redis · KMS-wrapped per-org DEK · TOTP enrolment + replay-safe verification · agent PATs + sessions · envelope crypto · Ed25519 signing of approved policies.
Streamable HTTP MCP at /mcp · verb-based brokers (db / http / ssh / compute / member.dispatch) · persistent + ephemeral broker modes · aixcld single-file bundle · aixcld up one-line enrolment.
Projects with per-session git checkouts · MR workflow · roster + audit + open MRs + resources view · task state machine (pending → in_progress → awaiting_review → completed) · append-only handoff log · fleet plane (Advanced) · cost accounting + budgets (Advanced).
First-run interactive tour · in-app Help tab with mental model, common workflows, security model, glossary, FAQ · Getting Started checklist that auto-completes.
More verbs · cloud-broker option for teams who can't host aixcld themselves · server-side agent loop driving doer/reviewer phases · public beta in late 2026.
Real questions, plain answers. If yours isn't here, email hello @ aixcl.com.
In the aixcld broker on the destination host — sealed locally with envelope crypto. The control plane never holds destination credentials; only the broker does. That's the whole architectural insight.
Yes — for now. One aixcld per destination host. aixcld up handles enrolment. A managed-broker option is on the roadmap for teams that can't self-host.
aixcl exposes a standard MCP server. You add it to your MCP client with a PAT: claude mcp add --transport http aixcl https://your.aixcl/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer aixcl_pat_…". The agent's tools become aixcl verbs.
No. You bring your own agent. aixcl never holds an LLM API key, never pays for tokens, never sees prompts beyond the structured intents the agent submits.
Every action ends up in an append-only audit log with sanitised params, outcome, byte counts, source IP, and the approval that authorised it. Exportable. Tamper-evident. We co-design the export format with regulated alpha customers.
Email hello @ aixcl.com with what you'd use aixcl for. We onboard alpha users one at a time so we can co-design with each. If we're not a fit, we'll tell you in the first reply.
The credential problem is about to become everyone's problem. The teams solving it now will move fastest later. Tell us what you'd put agents to work on — we'll reply within 48 hours, and if it's not a fit yet, we'll tell you what to watch for.